[HOME] [BOOKS] [ORDERING] [JOURNALS] [ABSTRACTS] [LINKS] [SPECIAL OFFERS]

Res Publica

A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy

Vol. III no.2 (1997) includes:

Tibor Machan, "Does Libertarianism Imply the Welfare State?", Res Publica III/2 (1997), 131-148: Classical liberal or libertarian polity champions negative liberty as the primary public good, yet some - most notably James P. Sterba - have argued that this is misleading. In fact, it is maintained, since negative liberty is defended on grounds that it serves the purpose of enabling citizens - by ridding them of intentional coercion by others - to pursue their flourishing or happiness, if they are economically or otherwise incapable of acting for this goal, such negative liberty is of no value to them. Thus before they can be expected to reasonably defend negative liberty, they require, also, a measure of positive freedom - i.e., some provisions that will enable them to take advantage of such negative liberty. In the present essay Tibor Machan examines the more recent development of this argument and argues that it is flawed because it confuses a moral point that is sound - namely, that in emergency situations taking provisions from another may bee the right thing to do - with a political point that is unsound - namely, having the basic right to taking provisions from others. The reasoning invoked to move from the moral to the political is, Machan argues, invalid. So, in fact, classical liberalism or libertarianism does not lend support to the welfare state. e-mail: Tibor_R._Machan@link.freedom.com

Ruth Arundell, "Machan Versus Locke: Is "Pure" Liberalism Possible?", Res Publica III/2 (1997), 149-163: This paper responds to a paper by Tibor Machan - "Does Libertarianism Imply the Welfare State" - in the same issue. In that paper Machan defends libertarianism as merely the purified and fully consistent conceptualization of Lockean "rights", arguing that as such it has the necessary moral foundations to be a contender for the status of the just or good human polity, and one which would engender less "innocent" poverty than does the welfare state. I argue that libertarianism cannot claim Lockean foundations. Either Locke's political philosophy is firmly grounded in natural law theory, in which case it cannot be "purified" of this without undermining its moral foundations or it is a composite position which, stripped of elements unwanted by libertarianism, reduces to a Hobbesian radical individualism which is ultimately subjectivist and cannot therefore support the claims Machan makes. Machan's attempt to redeploy statistics reflecting high levels of material inequality in the United States of America in service of the argument that people in less "libertarian" countries are worse off than even the poorest people in the U.S.A. fails, since arguments about the relative poverty of people in different countries need to take account of not only their income, but also their different social needs. e-mail: rma3@ukc.ac.uk

Philip Cole, "Problems with "Persons"", Res Publica III/2 (1997), 165-183: This paper critically examines the concept of a person that has come to play a central role in medical ethics. That concept claims that the most morally valuable lives are possessed by persons, and persons are beings that possess rationality and self-consciousness. This view also holds that only persons are morally wronged when they are killed, because only persons have an interest in continued life, by virtue of their rationality and self-consciousness. The paper looks in detail at this view as expressed by John Harris in The Value of Life, and argues that, to the extent that Harris is interpreted as offering an account of the moral value of personhood in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions - those conditions being rationality and self-consciousness - this must be a misinterpretation. No such account of personhood is available: rather, personhood is a "cluster" concept, and a set of necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be supplied. The paper further argues that, although the concept of a person is a moral concept, the distinction between persons and non-persons is not a moral distinction: that is, from an account of the moral value of persons, nothing follows concerning the moral value of non-persons. From, this, the paper rejects the view that the persons/non-persons distinction coincides with the immorality/acceptability of killing boundary, by critically examining the arguments of Dan W. Brock in Life and Death. e-mail: p.cole@mdx.ac.uk

Marcus Roberts, "The Endurance of History? Reflections on John Gray's Post-Enlightenment Pluralism", Res Publica III/2 (1997), 185-212: This article examines John Gray's recent critique of the 'Enlightenment Project'. It is especially concerned with his defence of a form of value pluralism, and, in particular, with his claim that this doctrine renders the enlightenment conception of human progress 'meaningless or incoherent'. It is argued that Gray is himself committed to a conception of human progress, both because he concedes that there is a universal minimum morality, and because his allegiance to value pluralism necessarily commits him to the view that there can be general progress in moral understanding. It is further argued that, paradoxically, acceptance of this version of value pluralism is inconsistent with the reproduction of many of the traditions within which, or so Gray himself claims, human beings have flourished. The general thrust of the argument is that while Gray's arguments are successful against the more myopic and hubristic progeny of the enlightenment, they provide no conclusive arguments for abandonment of a generic conception of human progress.

Michael Freeman, "Left, Right and Human Rights" (Review of Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, and The Age of Rights), Res Publica III/2 (1997), 213-220: Norberto Bobbio, in two recently translated books, has attempted to defend the continuing value of the concepts of 'left' and 'right' in political analysis, and to explain the implications of the idea of human rights. Bobbio holds that the political left is committed to equality whereas the right is committed to inequality. He differentiates this distinction from that between moderates and extremists. Moderates favour tolerant and democratic methods, whereas extremists prefer militaristic, authoritarian means. Moderates and extremists are found on the left and the right. However, while Bobbio makes some useful distinctions, his analysis of equality lacks refinement, and this failure undermines his attempt to distinguish left and right convincingly. Although Bobbio adopts a position of analytical neutrality, his preference is clearly for the moderate left. In his discussion of human rights, he calls for implementation of existing human-rights standards, but holds that justificatory theories are neither possible nor useful. Once again, his failure to examine the complexities of human-rights philosophy leaves us with a well-intentioned liberal programme, but a blunt justificatory basis for implementing it. e-mail: freema@essex.ac.uk

Gideon Calder, "Postmodernism and its Ironies" (Review of Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism and Michael Luntley, Reason, Truth and Self: The Postmodern Reconditioned), Res Publica III/2 (1997), 221-228: A review of two quite distinct approaches to the issues thrown up by postmodernist thinking in general. Both, I suggest, are well worth reading, though for separate reasons. Eagleton offers a sparkling and incisive corrective to the sloppier, more confused and politically most debilitating aspects of postmodernism which is both eminently readable and full of serious insights. Though rather fudgy amd generalistic in some parts, in others it provides a promising skecth for an alternative, socialist agenda for theory and practice. Luntley's book has a different mission: basically to harness key epistemological insights of postmodernism to a sort of modest realism freed of the scientistic reductionisms he takes to be typical of Enlightenment thought. It's a clearly argued, consistently interesting attempt, although I suggest that his approach is rather one-dimensional, arguably dealing in straw targets. I conclude by suggesting that thought there is much to be sceptical of in postmodernist thought, engagement with it is crucial, both to reveal its strengths and shortcomings and to demonstrate how its own targets might be shown to survive the postmodernist critique intact - a survival which, as Eagleton shows, may be crucial to the future of critical philosophy. e-mail: SENGJC@hum2s.Cardiff.ac.uk

Fiona Jenkins, "Luxemburg, Weil, Arendt: Heroines for a Humanist Feminism?" (Review article of Andrea Nye, PHILOSOPHIA), Res Publica III/2 (1997), 229-237: In reviewing Nye's contribution to feminist scholarship in a humanist spirit, I argue that whilst providing a useful survey of the writings of Luxemburg, Weil and Arendt and a timely reminder of their relevance to political theory and philosophy, Nye's work is insufficiently reflective about certain fundamental feminist questions, particularly about the limitations of a feminine marginality which is here celebrated for its critical potential. e-mail: fiona.jenkins@philosophy.usyd.edu.au

Graham McFee, "Interrogating Philosophy?" (Review of Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey and Roy Bhaskar Plato Etc.: The Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution) Res Publica III/2 (1997), 239-246: This is a review article, treating Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994) and Roy Bhaskar, Plato Etc.: The Problems of Philosophy and Their Resolution (London: Verso, 1994). It urges that Scruton's text represents an accurate description of the spirit of philosophical enquiry; and also of the issues that exercise it. Particularly rewarding is the combination of straight-forward treatments of key issues and a study-guide, with exercises, references and a critical commentary on texts referred to. In contrast, Bhaskar's book is one part of a general many-volume project, articulating what Bhaskar has called "dialectical critical realism". The text includes promises of arguments in forthcoming volumes. For this reason, philosophers who find his way of proceeding enlightening would be advised to wait for the publication of all the volumes of Bhaskar's project: then, at least, they can survey all of the 'hard ground'.

Paul Reynolds, "Max Weber: Still Relevant After All These Years?" (Review of Bryan Turner, Max Weber: From History to Modernity), Res Publica III/2 (1997), 247-253: This review article discusses the continuing relevance of the paradigmic modernist thinker, Max Weber, to contemporary social thought through a discussion of the recent publication of Bryan Turner, Max Weber: From History to Modernity. It supports Turner's view that a re-reading of Weber confirms his prescience in anticipating and discussing many of the themes which engage thinkers engaged with the ideas and critiques of post-modernism. Situating Weber in his historical, biographical and intellectual context helps the reader to understand the partiality of the reading of Weber as theorising modernity contra Marx. Turner shows how Weber needs to be understood in dialogue with Marx, and with Nietzsche, Simmel, George and the Romantics. For Turner, Weber is a sceptic of the 'benefits' of modernism and as a critical thinker who precociously grasped the complexities and problems of social theory which exercise post-modern critiques. He also recognised, however, the responsibility of social theorists to explain their world, and so avoided the quietism that has so characterised post-modern thinking. e-mail: reynoldp@admin.edge-hill-college.ac.uk

[HOME] [BOOKS] [ORDERING] [JOURNALS] [ABSTRACTS] [LINKS] [SPECIAL OFFERS]