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Dick W.P. Ruiter, "Legislation and Legal Institutions", in Hanneke van Schooten, ed., Semiotics and Legislation. Jurisprudential, Institutional and Sociological Perspectives, 139-158:

Legislation and legal institutions are related in two ways. First, most legal institutions exist by virtue of legislative rules. Secondly, legislation can only take place within the framework of a legal institution.

To clarify what legal institutions are, attention is paid to MacCormick's distinction between abstract institutional legal concepts on the one hand and particular legal institutions exemplifying such concepts on the other. MacCormick's classification, consisting of institutive rules, consequential rules, and terminative rules of legal institutions, is extended with three additional classes, namely, constitutive rules, content rules and invalidating rules. A test shows that complete legislation constituting a certain class of legal institution contains rules of all distinguished classes.

Legislation takes place by appeal to power-conferring rules that form part of a legal institution. The structure of power-conferring rules is shown to be:

The expression of legal judgments having certain states of affairs as their meanings by certain agents following certain procedures counts as making these states of affairs part of the legal institution concerned.

This structure answers to Searle's famous formula `x counts as y in context c'.

Modern legal systems are characterized as nested sets of legal institutions that are connected by the exercise of power-conferring rules.

The component parts of legal institutions are classified. This leads to a classification consisting of (i) declarative legal judgments presenting legal states of affairs, (ii) prescriptive legal judgments presenting legal obligations, (iii) directive legal judgments presenting non-mandatory norms, (iv) assertory legal judgments presenting legally granted facts, and (v) expressive legal judgments presenting states of mind.

Attention is paid to the manner in which legal institutions are socially accepted. Lagerspetz's conventionalist method of grounding the social existence of legal institutions on shared beliefs is critically examined and rejected.

It is concluded that the classical idea that legislation would mainly consist of general rules of conduct is far too simplistic. Modern legislation rather serves to present images of overall institutional environments that exert pressure to be socially realized. Legislation has become a form of institutional landscaping in which legal institutions of different classes are combined to provide fitting institutional environments.

Finally, a classification of legal institutions is proposed on the basis of a fourfold distinction between subjects, objects, properties and relations.



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