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Louis Wolcher, "Being Mistaken", Law
and Critique Vol.V no.2 (1994), 75-207: This article employs the method
of hermeneutic phenomenology, as interpreted by Martin Heidegger in Being
and Time, to display the phenomenon of mistake as it is lived. The goal
is to put in question the claims of mainstream legal thought concerning
the existentiality of its objects. The article does this by comparing the
phenomenon of mistake as we in fact live it with the concept of mistake
as it has been mythologized by Anglo-American legal doctrines governing
relief from contractual obligations due to mistake. Much depends, in numerous
fields of law, on the true knowledge/false knowledge dichotomy, and on the
existentiality of that to which these concepts correspond. But critical
phenomenology can be used to show that law's existential claims in this
area are hollow. The article uses phenomenology not to enact a new "essence
of mistake," but to destabilize the smugness which authorizes mainstream
legal consciousness to maintain a singular view of reality, deny complexity,
and encourage closure on its own terms. Author's mailing address: Professor
Louis E. Wolcher, 1100 N.E. Campus Parkway, Seattle, Washington 98105-6617,
U.S.A. E-mail address: wolcher@u.washington.edu
Louis Wolcher, "The Man in a Room: Remarks on
Derrida's Force of Law", Law and Critique Vol. VII no.1
(1996), 35-64: What can be said about the relations that subsist between
legal violence and justice? The need to ask this question is nowhere more
acutely felt than in contemplating the case of Nazi Germany's genocidal
"final solution of the Jewish problem": the state-sanctioned murder,
during the Second World War, of more than six million Jews in what has come
to be known as the Holocaust. In his article Force of Law, the French philosopher
Jacques Derrida-the founder and most famous practitioner of a form of criticism
called "deconstruction"- addresses the relationships between law
and justice, justice and the Holocaust, and justice and deconstruction.
Derrida's article essentially equates deconstruction with justice (or its
possibility). This equation emerges out of a reading of Walter Benjamin's
1921 essay, Critique of Violence, as that remarkable document is viewed
from the perspective of the Holocaust. The present article interrogates
and criticizes Derrida's text from a standpoint that problematizes both
the impulse to speak, and the impulse to be silent, in the face of what
is unjust. The standpoint of the present article is revealed by a comparison
of the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, and realizes
itself in a series of numbered remarks. These remarks find the equation
of justice and deconstruction to be on the very same level as the Benjaminian
critique of legal violence that Derrida seeks, unsuccessfully, to distance
himself from. Author's mailing address: Professor Louis E. Wolcher, 1100
N.E. Campus Parkway, Seattle, Washington 98105-6617, U.S.A. E-mail address:
wolcher@u.washington.edu
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