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Law and Language: The Italian Analytical
School
INTRODUCTION
by
Anna Pintore
Notes (to return to text, click here
for pt I, here for part II):
1. The idea for this anthology came from Bernard S. Jackson
and Mario Jori. The essays were chosen together with Mario Jori. Many thanks
to both.
2. More details concerning the history of the Italian
analytical legal school, can be found in E. Pattaro, "Il positivismo
giuridico italiano dalla rinascita alla crisi", Politica del diritto
III (1972), 821-852, now reprinted in U. Scarpelli, ed., Diritto e analisi
del linguaggio (Milan: Comunità, 1976), 469-76; U. Scarpelli, La
filosofia. La filosofia dell'etica. La filosofia del diritto di indirizzo
analitico in Italia, Introduction to U. Scarpelli, ed., Diritto e analisi
del linguaggio, op. cit., at 7-35; A. Baratta, Il positivismo e il neopositivismo,
in R. Orecchia, ed., La filosofia del diritto italiana nel XX secolo. Atti
dell'XI Congresso Nazionale della Società di Filosofia Giuridica
e Politica (Milan: Giuffrè, 1977), vol. II, 21-57; U. Scarpelli,
"Filosofia e diritto", in F. Tessitore, ed., La cultura filosofia
italiana dal 1945 al 1980 nelle sue relazioni con altri campi del sapere
(Napoli: Guida, 1982), 173-199; E. Pattaro, Per una mappa del sapere giuridico,
in U. Scarpelli, ed., La teoria generale del diritto. Problemi e tendenze
attuali. Studi dedicati a Norberto Bobbio (Milan: Comunità, 1983),
249-279; M. Jori, Il giuspositivismo analitico italiano prima e dopo la
crisi (Milan: Giuffrè, 1988); M.A. Barrere Unzueta, La escuela de
Bobbio. Reglas y normas en la filosofía jurídica italiana
de inspiracíon analitica, (Madrid: Tecnos, 1990); M. Barberis, Introduzione
alla storia della filosofia del diritto (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993), ch.VII.
In particular, on Bobbio and the Italian analytical theory of law, see P.
Borsellino, Norberto Bobbio metateorico del diritto (Milan: Giuffrè
1991), esp. ch.I.
3. See Pattaro, Diritto e analisi del linguaggio, supra
n.2, at 455.
4. See his "Essere e dover essere nella scienza giuridica",
Rivista di Filosofia LVIII (1967), 235-62, reprinted in his Studi sulla
teoria generale del diritto (Turin: Giappichelli, 1970), 139-73.
5. Bobbio has always seen his own role in all modesty
simply as an importer of Kelsen into Italy. What he actually did is much
more important. Kelsen's thought has been central in the discussion of first-generation
Italian analysts, up to the crisis of Italian analytical legal positivism
(see infra in the text).
The last decade have seen a revival of interest in Kelsen,
but in different, more detached terms: from the viewpoint of "Kelsenologists"
rather than that of "Kelsenians". Thanks to Letizia Gianformaggio,
several seminars on Kelsen have been held. The proceedings of these are
now being published: see L. Gianformaggio, ed., Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory.
A Diacronic Point of View (Turin Giappichelli, 1990); L. Gianformaggio,
ed, Sistemi statici e sistemi dinamici. Analisi di una tipologia kelseniana
(Turin: Giappichelli, 1991); L. Gianformaggio and S. Paulson eds., Cognition
and Interpretation of Law (Turin: Giappichelli, 1995).
6. See Il positivismo giuridico italiano, supra n.2, at
451.
7. The works are: U. Scarpelli, Filosofia analitica e
giurisprudenza (Milan: Nuvoletti, 1953); U. Scarpelli, Il problema della
definizione e il concetto di diritto (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino,
1955); U. Scarpelli, Contributo alla semantica del linguaggio normativo
(Turin: Memorie dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, 1959; latest edition:
Milan: Giuffrè, 1985). As a matter of naked chronological fact, it
was Scarpelli who first in Italy mentioned analytical philosophy in connection
with legal philosophy. This was in a brief note bearing the same title as
Bobbio's essay: "Scienza del diritto e analisi del linguaggio",
Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 4 (1950), 342-67, repr.
in U. Scarpelli, ed., Diritto e analisi del linguaggio (Milan: Edizioni
di Comunità, 1976), 287-324, and in U. Scarpelli and P. Di Lucia,
eds., Il linguaggio del diritto (Milan: Ledi, 1994), 87-93.
8. N. Bobbio, Giusnaturalismo e positivismo giuridico
(Milan: Comunità, 1965); U. Scarpelli, Cos'è il positivismo
giuridico (Milan: Comunità, 1965).
9. See Jori, supra n.2.
10. See for example his criticism of the Hartian normative
conception of legal obligation in the essay in this volume.
11. Discussion of the works of Bobbio and Scarpelli of
the first period culminated with a Tavola rotonda sul positivismo giuridico,
the proceedings of which were published as a monographic issue of Il Politico
(Milan: Giuffrè, 1967). For the reconstruction of this stage of the
debate, see in particular Jori's work cited in note 2.
12. See Bobbio, supra n.4. Bobbio distinguishes three
main senses of "legal positivism": as a value-free approach to
law; as a legalistic theory of law and state; as an ideology of justice
affirming the duty to obey the law as such. See N. Bobbio, Il positivismo
giuridico (Turin: Giappichelli, 1960; latest edition: 1996).
13. See N. Bobbio, Dalla struttura alla funzione (Milan:
Comunità, 1977). Bobbio has since then devoted his time more and
more intensely to the study of political philosophy and political science,
to the neglect of the theory of law.
14. It is not clear whether Scarpelli in his last works
still adheres to legal positivism, even in the political version that he
himself theorised. See his "Dalla legge al codice, dal codice ai princìpi",
Rivista di Filosofia LXXVIII (1987), 3-15, and "Il positivismo giuridico
rivisitato", Rivista di Filosofia LXXX (1989), 461-475.
15. See U. Scarpelli, "La critica analitica a Kelsen",
in Rivista di filosofia LXXII (1981), 481-490; idem, "Filosofia e diritto",
supra n.2, at 177-79; R. Guastini, Dalle fonti alle norme (Turin: Giappichelli,
1990; 2nd ed., Turin: Giappichelli, 1992), 296ff. Scarpelli and Guastini
both mention this weak sense, but they have always understood and practiced
linguistic analysis in the strongest sense indicated in the text.
16. Thus V. Villa, "Sulla nozione di "filosofia
analitica"", in M. Jori, ed., Ermeneutica e filosofia analitica.
Due concezioni del diritto a confronto (Turin: Giappichelli, 1994), 163-181.
Villa refers to the ideas of Dummett. See also M. Barberis, "Vincoli
e strumenti. Sulla filosofia analitica del diritto", Analisi e diritto
6 (1995), 7-26.
17. See M. Jori, Filosofia del diritto, in M. Jori and
A. Pintore, Manuale di teoria generale del diritto (Turin: Giappichelli,
1988; latest ediction: 1995), 111ff.
18. Here I have adapted P.G. Monateri's witty metaphor
in Giurisprudenza, entry in the Digesto delle Discipline Privatistiche.
Sezione civile (Turin: Utet, 1993), 165.
19. See G. Gavazzi, L'onere. Tra la libertà e l'obbligo
(Turin: Giappichelli, 1970, now in his Studi di teoria del diritto, Turin:
Giappichell,i 1993), 318.
20. Gavazzi, ibid.
21. See Jori, supra n.17; Guastini, supra n. 15, at 286ff.
22. According to Bobbio this thesis is at the core of
a theory of natural law: Bobbio, supra n.8, at 185ff.
23. G. Carcaterra, Il problema della fallacia naturalistica
(Milan: Giuffrè, 1969).
24. See especially Scarpelli, Contributo, supra n.7.
25. An important document at this stage is represented
by a debate that took place in the 1970s on the Is-Ought question, with
the participation of Scarpelli, Carcaterra and Lecaldano. The proceedings
are to be found in U. Scarpelli, ed., "La logica e il dover essere",
a monographic issue of the Rivista di Filosofia LXVII (1976).
26. The reference is to N. MacCormick, "Contemporary
Philosophy: the Rediscovery of Practical Reason", Journal of Law and
Society 10 (1983), 1-18. See C. Faralli and E. Pattaro, eds., Reason in
Law (Milan: Giuffrè, 1985-88. 3 vols.), which is a collection of
the proceedings of an international meeting held in Bologna in 1984. Ragion
Pratica (Practical Reason) is also the title of a recent journal which is
the result of interdisciplinary collaboration between jurists and legal
and moral philosophers, both of analytical and other orientations.
27. Published in L. Gianformaggio and E. Lecaldano, eds,
Etica e diritto (Milan: Angeli, 1986).
28. L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo
penale (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1989). See also L. Gianformaggio, ed., Le ragioni
del garantismo. Discutendo con Luigi Ferrajoli (Turin: Giappichelli, 1993).
29. See Jori, Ermeneutica e filosofia analitica, supra
n.15. The hermeneutic scholars closest to the Italian analytical school
are Francesco Viola and Giuseppe Zaccaria.
30. The distinction between analytic and synthetic, as
is well known, has been defined as a dogma of empiricism by its detractors
and as a cornerstone of empiricism by its supporters. See W.V.O. Quine,
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951) and G. Bergmann, "Two Cornestones
of Empiricism" (1953), both reprinted in F. Zabeeh, E.D. Klemke and
A. Jacobson, eds, Readings in Semantics (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1974).
31. Conversely, two analytical scholars of the latest
generation, Barberis and Villa, are openly critical towards the neo-empiricism
of the analytical school: see V. Villa, Teorie della scienza giuridica e
teorie delle scienze naturali (Milan: Giuffrè, 1984), idem, Conoscenza
giuridica e concetto di diritto positivo (Turin: Giappichelli, 1993); M.
Barberis, Il diritto come discorso e come comportamento (Turin: Giappichelli,
1990).
32. On the contrary, from a post-positivist standpoint
Vittorio Villa refers to a much weaker model of scientificity and consequently
is able to reach the conclusion that descriptive jurisprudence, after all,
belongs to the realm of scientific discourse. See the works by Villa mentioned
supra n.31.
33. See especially G. Tarello, Diritto, enunciati, usi
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974); L'interpretazione della legge (Milan: Giuffrè,
1980).
34. Bobbio's conception in the 1950s was rightly criticised
(by Pattaro: see the essay published herein) because he judged rigour to
be a sufficient requisite to turn so-called legal science into a scientific
enterprise. Ferrajoli, on the other hand (see his essay herein), states
that juristic discourse may, under certain conditions (precision of normative
meanings, faithfulness in interpreting the law), become a science in the
fullest sense and be endowed with truth value.
35. The theoretical reformer must face up to another awkward
problem: that of distinguishing between the new empirical legal science
and some "old" empirical approach to legal facts, in particular
the sociology of law. The question did actually embarrass Ross, who answered
it in a rather unconvincing way: see A. Ross, On Law and Justice (London:
Stevens & Sons 1958), ch.I.
36. Tarello's position is peculiar: he criticises the
normativistic attempt to separate the sociology of law from legal science,
and favours socio-juridical investigations that jurists already perform
within the single legal disciplines for practical reasons: a sociology within
law, or better, within legal doctrine, rather than a sociology of law. See
G. Tarello, "La sociologia nella giurisprudenza", Sociologia del
diritto I (1974), 40-51.
37. The leading texts of semiotic prescriptivism are:
R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952);
U. Scarpelli, Contributo, supra n.7; idem, Semantica, morale, diritto (Turin:
Giappichelli, 1969); A. Ross, Directives and Norms (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1968).
See M. Jori, "Tendances en semiotique juridique",
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de
Sémiotique Juridique 2 (1989), 277-300, in which a description of
the main tendencies in contemporary legal semiotics is given, together with
criticism of non-analytical semiotics, especially that of B.S. Jackson.
See B.S. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1985, repr. Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1997); see also
B.S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Merseyside: Deborah Charles
Publications, 1988).
38. Significantly, the principal exponent of this tendency,
Giovanni Tarello, devoted himself to studies of legal history and the history
of legal culture. See especially G. Tarello, Storia della cultura giuridica
moderna. Vol. I: Assolutismo e codificazione del diritto (Bologna: Il Mulino,
1976).
39. For the distinction between performance-oriented and
competence-oriented semiotics, see M. Jori, "Tendances en semiotique
juridique", supra n.37.
40. See Jori, supra n.37.
41. See Guastini, supra n.20, at 286-288.
42. An excellent view of the most recent analytical themes
and interests is to be found in the volumes of Analisi e diritto, edited
by P. Comanducci and R. Guastini. These publications have been issued since
1990 and include both legal and philosophical papers, by authors from several
countries.
To return to text, click here
for pt I, here for part II
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