A.-M. Dubarle, "Le Jugement de Salomon: un coeur à l'écoute"' Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 63 (1979), 419-427. - The author discusses the story in 1 Kings 3:16-28. He finds no adequate grounds for questioning its historicity and claims that it reflects the judicial practice of a fifty-fifty division between the two parties to a case, when the statements of the witnesses contradict each other without the possibility of a resolution. At the same time, great attention is paid to the human predicament, thus making it possible to go beyond the normal procedure. (J.D.)

A. Grossman, "Offenders and Violent Men in Jewish Society in Early Ashkenaz and their Influence upon Legal Procedure" (Heb.), Shenaton 8 (1981), 135-152. - The article describes the phenomenon of violent opposition to the rulings of the Jewish community and its courts in the early period of Ashkenazic Jewry. According to Grossman, this phenomenon was influential in the alteration of Jewish legal procedure in this period, which was undertaken in order to combat violence and strengthen communal authority over translucent offenders. (Y.S.K.)

Eberhard Klingenberg, "Urteil, Schiedsspruch und Vergleich im römischen, griechischen und jüdischen Recht", in "Wie gut sind Deine Zelte, Jaakow...", Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Reinhold Mayer, ed. E.L. Ehrlich, B. Klappert and U. Ast, Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1986, pp.63-75.

J. L. Kugel, "On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach: Early Exegesis of Leviticus 19:17", Harvard Theological Review 80 (1987), 43-61. - The injunction "not to hate your brother in your heart, but reproach him" (Lev. 19:17) was understood in two main ways by early Jewish exegetes. Either as simple psychological advice: do not let grudges simmer, but explain yourself to your neighbour before hatred builds up (so Prov. 25:9-10; Sir. 19:13-17). Or as a judicial requirement that grievances must be aired informally with your neighbour before they are brought to court. To keep silent and then without warning to raise the issue in court is not allowed (so T Gad 6:1-5; CD 9:2-8). (G.J.W.)

Emanuel Rackman, "The Case of the Sotah in Jewish Law: Ordeal or Psychodrama", National Jewish Law Review III (1988), 49-64.

G.T. Sheppard, "More on Isaiah 5:1-7 as a Juridical Parable", CBQ 44 (1982), 45-47. - S. argues that Is. 3:13-15 contains the missing parts of an original juridical parable preserved in Is. 5:1-7. He appeals to the fragmentary character of 3:13-15, its resemblance to 5:1-7, and evidence of similar displacement in Is. 1-12 (Is. 5:15-17 and 2:6-22; 9:8-21 and 5:25-30). He reconstructs the juridical parable as follows: parable, 5:1-2; judgment (implied on part of audience); interpretation, 3:13-14; indictment, 3:15; further interpretation, 5:7; summons to judge in light of interpretation, 5:3-4 (cf. 2 Sam. 14:15ff.); sentence, 5:5-6. 5:7 is placed after 5:1-6 to serve as a conclusion to a "love story" which trails suddenly into judgment. 3:15 supplies the missing rhetorical question appropriate to an indictment. This supports Yee's view that Is. 5:1-7 was originally a juridical parable. (K.W.W.)



   Search this site            powered by FreeFind

The Jewish Law Association website is
hosted by the Centre for Jewish Studies
at the University of Manchester

About | Officers | Constitution | Membership | Conferences
Publications | Abstracts | Resources | Courses | Links

View the framed or non-framed version of this site