A.-M. Dubarle, "Le Jugement de Salomon: un coeur à l'écoute"'
Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 63 (1979),
419-427. - The author discusses the story in 1 Kings 3:16-28.
He finds no adequate grounds for questioning its historicity and claims
that it reflects the judicial practice of a fifty-fifty division between
the two parties to a case, when the statements of the witnesses contradict
each other without the possibility of a resolution. At the same time, great
attention is paid to the human predicament, thus making it possible to go
beyond the normal procedure. (J.D.)
A. Grossman, "Offenders and Violent Men in Jewish Society in
Early Ashkenaz and their Influence upon Legal Procedure" (Heb.),
Shenaton 8 (1981), 135-152. - The article describes the phenomenon
of violent opposition to the rulings of the Jewish community and its courts
in the early period of Ashkenazic Jewry. According to Grossman, this phenomenon
was influential in the alteration of Jewish legal procedure in this period,
which was undertaken in order to combat violence and strengthen communal
authority over translucent offenders. (Y.S.K.)
Eberhard Klingenberg, "Urteil, Schiedsspruch und Vergleich im
römischen, griechischen und jüdischen Recht", in "Wie
gut sind Deine Zelte, Jaakow...", Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von
Reinhold Mayer, ed. E.L. Ehrlich, B. Klappert and U. Ast, Gerlingen:
Bleicher Verlag, 1986, pp.63-75.
J. L. Kugel, "On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach: Early Exegesis
of Leviticus 19:17", Harvard Theological Review 80 (1987), 43-61.
- The injunction "not to hate your brother in your heart, but reproach
him" (Lev. 19:17) was understood in two main ways by early Jewish
exegetes. Either as simple psychological advice: do not let grudges simmer,
but explain yourself to your neighbour before hatred builds up (so Prov.
25:9-10; Sir. 19:13-17). Or as a judicial requirement that grievances
must be aired informally with your neighbour before they are brought to
court. To keep silent and then without warning to raise the issue in court
is not allowed (so T Gad 6:1-5; CD 9:2-8). (G.J.W.)
Emanuel Rackman, "The Case of the Sotah in Jewish Law: Ordeal
or Psychodrama", National Jewish Law Review III (1988), 49-64.
G.T. Sheppard, "More on Isaiah 5:1-7 as a Juridical Parable",
CBQ 44 (1982), 45-47. - S. argues that Is. 3:13-15 contains
the missing parts of an original juridical parable preserved in Is.
5:1-7. He appeals to the fragmentary character of 3:13-15, its resemblance
to 5:1-7, and evidence of similar displacement in Is. 1-12 (Is.
5:15-17 and 2:6-22; 9:8-21 and 5:25-30). He reconstructs the juridical parable
as follows: parable, 5:1-2; judgment (implied on part of audience); interpretation,
3:13-14; indictment, 3:15; further interpretation, 5:7; summons to judge
in light of interpretation, 5:3-4 (cf. 2 Sam. 14:15ff.); sentence,
5:5-6. 5:7 is placed after 5:1-6 to serve as a conclusion to a "love
story" which trails suddenly into judgment. 3:15 supplies the missing
rhetorical question appropriate to an indictment. This supports Yee's view
that Is. 5:1-7 was originally a juridical parable. (K.W.W.)
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