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Deborah Charles Publications
Abstracts' Library
Authors F
M. I. Festenstein, " Pragmatism and Liberalism:
Interpreting Dewey's Political Philosophy", Res Publica 1/2
(1995), 163-182: What is the relationship between the pragmatist tradition
of philosophy and political theory? This paper contests both a 'received
view' of John Dewey's moral and political philosophy, which emphasises its
instrumental character. It examines Dewey's holistic account of the nature
of moral theory, his teleological conception of moral agency, and the foundations
of his liberal political thought in these two ideas. However, recognition
of the centrality of this moral framework furnishes the basis upon which
to contest a 'revisionist view' of Dewey, which promotes him as an important
advocate of participatory democracy. Internal difficulties in this framework
suggest that revisionist promoters must either skate rather superficially
over his political philosophy (in this respect joining the proponents of
the received view) or offer a substantial reconstruction of his political
thought. Dr M. I. Festenstein, Department of Politics, University of Hull,
Cottingham Road, Hull HU6 7RX. e-mail: M.I.Festenstein@politics.hull.ac
.uk
Eveline T. Feteris, "Recent Developments in Legal
Argumentation Theory: Dialectical Approaches to Legal Argumentation",
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law VII/20 (1994), 134-153. Click
here for extended abstract. e-mail: e.feteris@let.uva.nl
Peter Fitzpatrick, "Relational Power and the Limits of Law",
in Law and Power, ed. Tuori, Bankowski
and Uusitalo (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1997), 85-97: Theories
of relational power claim to resolve the divide between law as autonomous
and law as dependent - dependent on, say, society. The relation between
law and society then becomes one of mutual influence. Yet, with relational
theory, there is nothing to stop these entities disappearing in the relation.
This chapter seeks to refine relational theory by showing that the `autonomy'
of the entities should not be seen as given beforehand. `Autonomy' is, rather,
created and sustained in the relation.
Michael Freeman, "Left, Right and Human Rights" (Review of
Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction,
and The Age of Rights), Res Publica III/2 (1997), 213-220:
Norberto Bobbio, in two recently translated books, has attempted to defend
the continuing value of the concepts of 'left' and 'right' in political
analysis, and to explain the implications of the idea of human rights. Bobbio
holds that the political left is committed to equality whereas the right
is committed to inequality. He differentiates this distinction from that
between moderates and extremists. Moderates favour tolerant and democratic
methods, whereas extremists prefer militaristic, authoritarian means. Moderates
and extremists are found on the left and the right. However, while Bobbio
makes some useful distinctions, his analysis of equality lacks refinement,
and this failure undermines his attempt to distinguish left and right convincingly.
Although Bobbio adopts a position of analytical neutrality, his preference
is clearly for the moderate left. In his discussion of human rights, he
calls for implementation of existing human-rights standards, but holds that
justificatory theories are neither possible nor useful. Once again, his
failure to examine the complexities of human-rights philosophy leaves us
with a well-intentioned liberal programme, but a blunt justificatory basis
for implementing it. e-mail: freema@essex.ac.uk
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