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Deborah Charles Publications
Abstracts' Library
Authors J
Bernard S. Jackson, "Envisaging Law",
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law VII/21 (1994), 311-334:
This paper considers the nature and use of images in justice, rather than
particular images of justice. We can distinguish three different types of
question regarding the relations between the linguistic and the visual in
respect of the legal system: "cultural", "causal", and
"physiological" questions. By "cultural", I mean the
attitudes expressed within particular cultures (national, professional,
etc.) towards particular forms of sense construction: in this context, do
they claim some privilege for language or for visual representation? By
"causal", I mean the causal relationship between sensory data
inputs and the sense actually constructed (within any particular semiotic
group): in this context, is there evidence to suggest that visually-constructed
images have greater potency in the construction of legal sense than do linguistically-constructed
images? By "physiological", I mean those processes within the
brain which are activated in the transformation of sensory inputs into perceived
sense. I illustrate each of these separate questions, and ponder to some
degree their inter-relationship. e-mail: bsj@legaltheory.demon.co.uk
B.S. Jackson, "The Literary Presentation of Multiculturalism
in Early Biblical Law", International Journal for the Semiotics
of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique VIII/23
(1995), 181-206: This paper argues for an integral relationship between
law and narrative in the Bible. Two events within that narrative history
stand out: the creation of the world (the foundation of universal history)
and the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt (the foundation of their particular
history). This distinction forms the organising structure of the Decalogue
itself. The Decalogue refers explicitly to the exodus (in introducing the
"particular" laws) and creation (in introducing the "universal"
laws). Moreover, the particular and the universal laws invoke quite different
forms of semiosis: the former involve the construction of the Israelites'
particular sense of the sacred, through feelings of loyalty and the use
of body language, smell, taste, speech and time; the latter consist in action
qualified as bad by a cognitive process. The Israelite v. stranger opposition
continues to structure the law codes: the "love commandment",
for example, is separately stated in Lev. 19 in relation to a "neighbour"
and a "stranger". e-mail: bsj@legaltheory.demon.co.uk
Bernard S. Jackson, "Truth or Proof: The Criminal Verdict",
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale
de Sémiotique Juridique Vol. XI no.33 (1998), 227-273: In the
light of current controversies in the English-speaking world, this article
offers a semiotic analysis of the meaning of the "not guilty"
verdict (professionally constructed as relating only to proof), and compares
the understanding of the "guilty" verdict (which even professionals
construct as making truth claims). The public policy argument is compared
to a jurisprudential debate (Kelsen, Bulygin) about the status of facts
proved in the legal process and related to philosophical discussion of the
nature of "truth". A central, underlying issue is the relationship
between language and "reality", so often discussed in semiotics
as a problem of conceptualising "reference". Though the emphasis
here is on the construction of "concepts" ("guilty",
"not guilty"), so that the semiotic analysis focuses largely on
the "paradigmatic" axis of signification (that of the semiotic
square), it becomes apparent how closely related are the differences in
concept construction to the pragmatics of discourse: who is constructing
the concepts, and for what purposes. Behind such concept formation, I suggest,
there reside implicit narrativisations of pragmatics. The argument is illustrated
by reference to the problems surrounding a recent English cause célêbre,
the investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence. e-mail: Bernard.Jackson@man.ac.uk
Bernard S. Jackson, "With Reference to Touchie", International
Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique
Juridique Vol. XI no.31 (1998), 79-93: In response to John C.W. Touchie,
"Jackson on the "Decisions" Underlying the Application of
Rules", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale
de Sémiotique Juridique Vol. X no.30 (1997), 317-335, Jackson
argues that Touchie's critique overlooks Jackson's fundamental starting
point in his original critique of MacCormick's account of the justification
of legal decisions (once rendered "easy") through the normative
syllogism. This starting point is the distinction between semantics and
pragmatics, and the nature of "reference" within pragmatics. Prompted
by Touchie's observation that "one could not be within the sphere of
"pure" grammar and at the same time not obey the rules of grammar",
Jackson restates his position using the Chomskian distinction between competence
and performance. While logic as a system operates without the intervention
of "decisions", logic in use is part of the pragmatic dimension
of language, which requires consideration of the identity and purposes of
its users. e-mail: Bernard.Jackson@man.ac.uk
Fiona Jenkins, "Luxemburg, Weil, Arendt: Heroines for a Humanist
Feminism?" (Review article of Andrea Nye, PHILOSOPHIA), Res
Publica III/2 (1997), 229-237: In reviewing Nye's contribution to feminist
scholarship in a humanist spirit, I argue that whilst providing a useful
survey of the writings of Luxemburg, Weil and Arendt and a timely reminder
of their relevance to political theory and philosophy, Nye's work is insufficiently
reflective about certain fundamental feminist questions, particularly about
the limitations of a feminine marginality which is here celebrated for its
critical potential. e-mail: fiona.jenkins@philosophy.usyd.edu.au
Gerry Johnstone, "Towards a Revised Image
of Therapeutic Approaches to Crime", Law and Critique, vol.
7, no. 2 [1996], 193-216: Today, therapeutic interventions into the lives
of offenders tend to be seen and understood as methods of social control
which - although they do nothing to remove the real causes of criminality
- render deviants more docile. This essay questions the adequacy of this
view, arguing that it is based upon a partial and mistaken image of the
nature of therapeutic interventions. Critical criminology and socio-legal
studies, in particular, has failed to grasp the true nature of the practice
of treatment in penal settings, in at least two ways. First, it has tended
to direct its criticisms towards 'hard' medical therapeutic approaches to
crime, thereby ignoring and deflecting critical attention away from the
'soft' social therapies which are much more common in practice. Second,
even when it does examine sociotherapeutic approaches to crime, it tends
to misinterpret their objectives and operational principles. It tends to
assume that all therapeutic interventions into the lives of offenders share
the same objective: to eliminate or at least control those tendencies which
render the person a danger or nuisance to society. This paper argues, however,
that in much sociotherapy, the aim is to add something to the offender,
namely the social habits and competencies which an individual requires in
order to participate in productive and fulfilling social relationships.
Mailing Address: Gerry Johnstone, Law School, University of Hull, Hull HU6
7RX, United Kingdom; E-Mail Address: J.G.Johnstone@law.hull.ac.uk
Mario Jori, "On Touchie, Logic and the Universe", International
Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique
Juridique Vol. XI no.31 (1998), 59-65: My bottom line is the following.
I think that Touchie's central argument against Jackson is wrong, but in
being wrong he raises several important points about Jackson's epistemology
and legal theory. Touchie's central argument is that Jackson cannot argue
both that reference always requires individual choices, and at the same
time that (pure) propositional logic, being a rigorous calculus, does not
require such choices or decisions. According to Touchie, Jackson can either
be "sceptic" or "non-sceptic" about both logic and reference.
On the contrary, Jackson says that interpretive decisions are required only
by reference, the applying or interpreting or ascribing words and sentences
to actual facts. Where Touchie in my opinion is wrong is about formal logic.
Pure formal logic is indeed a rigorous calculus involving no choices apart
from accepting the rules of the logic game. On the other hand, I agree with
the other part of Touchie's argument, that the amount of choice required
by concrete acts of reference (ascribing language to things) can be variably
reduced by making the language more precise. I agree that such interpretive
choices can be reduced to a practical nil for the normal purposes of particular
kinds of descriptions (the easy cases in jurisprudence and the normal cases
in ordinary life and language). e-mail jori@fildir.unimi.it
Eva M.B. Joyce, "The Law of Gift and the Law
of Theft", The Liverpool Law Review xviii/2 (1996), 207-212:
It is argued in this article that the criminal law of theft and the civil
law should "march hand in hand". The recent case of Mazo
[1996] Criminal Law Review 435 is analysed in terms of the reasons given
by the court of Appeal for allowing the appeal against conviction and there
is a response to part of the commentary on the case by Professor J C Smith.
The civil law involved in the case is the law of gift; the effect of the
decision is that the law of theft and the law of gift are not in conflict,
but the point is made that there should not be conflict between theft and
the civil law generally, that the criminal law ought to be based upon civil
law concepts because they determine the distinction between 'mine' and 'thine'.Miranda
Kaye, "Equity's Treatment of Sexually Transmitted Debt", Feminist
Legal Studies V/1 (1997), 35-55: The practice of creditors requiring
that women assume liability for the debts of their (male) partner can be
termed Sexually Transmitted Debt (STD). STD is a stark confrontation of
the public and private spheres. When the law considers the private arrangement
made between the woman and her partner it is in the context of a public
dispute between the bank and the woman (and possibly her partner). The paper
considers why women are more susceptible to STD than men and concludes that
this may arise due to a power imbalance created by gender. The paper discusses
the case-law in the area, particularly post Barclays v O'Brien, and concludes
that equity is not redressing the gendered power imbalance experienced by
women in STD situations. As such equity currently is not fulfilling the
maxim 'equity is equality'. Until equity's conceptualisation of inequalities
includes the gendered power imbalance, it has little potential as a cure
for STD and the focus must start to shift to prophylactic action to reduce
the incidence of STD.
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